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As part of its Digital Single Market strategy, the European Commission envisages
to take action aimed at eradicating the practice of blocking one’s website to persons
established  or residing  in a particular  EU Member  State.  To that  extent,  a 2015
proposal for a regulation on the portability of online streaming services and a 2016
proposal for a regulation on geo-blocking outside the audio-visual context have been
presented, the scope of which will be analysed in this paper.
Although  the proposed  Regulations  would  tackle  topical  problems  in EU
e-commerce  and thus  offer  a necessary  step  forward  in enhancing  cross-border
trade in the European Union, their envisaged regulatory approach raises important
concerns from enforcement and rules’ circumvention points of view.
Taking stock of those two concerns, the paper will reflect upon ways to mitigate
their detrimental effects. Arguing that the geo-blocking proposals already contain
the basic  tools  for such  mitigation,  the paper  advocates  the adoption  of a more
streamlined EU competition law and e-commerce regulation enforcement strategy,
complemented by a “technologically more pro-active” EU law interpretation stance
to e-commerce at the EU level.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In May  2015,  the European  Commission  set  itself  the ambitious  goal
to establish  a Digital  Single  Market  (DSM).  Focused  primarily  on better
access  for consumers  and businesses  to online  goods  and services  across
Europe,1 the Commission has proposed new legislation aimed at removing
obstacles to free online cross-border trade. Key targets in this regard have
been instances of geo-blocking, where access to goods or services is blocked
for reasons  of residence  or nationality  of (potential)  customers.  Seeking
to eradicate such instances, the EU proposed two Regulations, one relating
to audio-visual  media  and another  more  generally  to most  other  goods
and services.  Although  both  proposed  regulations  differ  in scope
and ambition,  they  allow  to understand  how  the EU  envisages
the Regulation of technology in the context of its DSM agenda.
In proposing  both  Regulations,  the European  Commission  opted
to proceed with a piecemeal approach to e-commerce regulation. Section 2
of this  paper  analyses  and frames  that  approach.  Following this  analysis,
section  3  will  argue  that,  to the extent  the Commission  deems  more
regulation  of e-commerce  necessary,  the envisaged  piecemeal  approach
raises important concerns from an enforcement and a rules’ circumvention
point  of view.  Taking  stock  of those  two  concerns,  section  4  will
subsequently  reflect  upon  ways  to mitigate  their  detrimental  effects.
In doing  so,  it  advocates  the adoption  of a more  streamlined  EU
competition  law  –  e-commerce  regulation  enforcement  strategy,
complemented more generally by a “technologically more pro-active” EU law
interpretation strategy in the realm of e-commerce.
Before developing this argument, it is important to stress that the paper
should  not  be  understood  as implicitly  approving  the Commission’s
regulatory approach as the only right one. The approach towards, and even
the need for, EU e-commerce regulation can be contested in their own right
indeed. Preferring not to enter into those debates here, all the more given
that the EU institutions clearly prefer to move forward on this strategy, this
paper’s  aim  is  rather  to look  for ways  that  can  turn  the Commission’s
preferred regulatory approach in a stronger and more sustainable one.
1 European Commission (2015) a Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe. COM/2015/192 final,
section 2. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:
52015DC0192&from=EN [Accessed 11 June 2017] (hereafter DSM Strategy). 
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2. THE COMMISSION’S GEO-BLOCKING PROPOSALS
Geo-blocking refers  to a set  of traders’  practices consisting in the blocking
of access  to websites  and other  online  interfaces  and the rerouting
of customers from one country version to another.2 Those practices can take
place in relation to both consumer goods and – most obviously – to digital
content  available  in one  Member  State  to which  a customer  residing
in another  Member  State  wants  to gain  access.  In the latter  case,  digital
content  will  be  made  unavailable  to customers  having  their  IP-address
located outside the Member State concerned.3 The prevalence this practice is
problematic from the point of view of a European Union wanting to create
and maintain  an internal  market  characterised  by the free  flow  of goods
and services.4
Although  existing  EU  law  would  already  prohibit  certain  of those
practices,5 more  tailored  regulation  was  felt  necessary  to oblige  traders
to stop  blocking  access  to their  websites  or online  ordering  systems.
The European  Union  presented  two  specific  proposals  in that  regard.
Firstly, the Commission in December 2015 proposed a Regulation enabling
subscribers  to audio-visual  streaming  services  to keep  their  subscription
when temporarily residing in another Member State (2.1). Secondly, a May
2016  proposal  would  prohibit  traders  more  generally  to continue  geo-
blocking customers (2.2).
2 European Commission (2016)  Issues paper presenting initial  findings of the e-commerce  sector
inquiry  conducted by the Directorate-General  for Competition.  SWD(2016)  70  final,  recital  32
Available  from:  http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/e-commerce_swd_en.pdf  
[Accessed 11 June 2017] (hereafter referred to as geo-blocking initial findings report).
3 European  Commission  (2016)  Antitrust  e-commerce  sector  inquiry  finds  geo-blocking  is
widespread throughout EU. [press release] 18 March. Available from: http://europa.eu/rapid/
press-release_IP-16-922_en.htm [Accessed  11  June  2017].  A final  report,  published  on 10
May 2017, confirmed those findings. For that report, see European Commission (2017) Final
Report  on the E-commerce Sector  Inquiry. COM(2017) 229 final.  Available from:  http://ec.eu
ropa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiry_final_report_en.pdf [Accessed 11 June 2017].
4 At the same time, however,  geo-blocking often also serves as a tool  to ensure compliance
with  nationally-structured  copyright  laws.  See  for that  perspective  already  Trimble,  M.
(2012) the Future of Cybertravel. Legal implications of the evasion of geolocation.  Fordham
Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal, 22(3), p. 570. See also Trimble, M.
(2016)  Geoblocking,  Technical  Standards  and the Law.  In:  R.  Lobata and J.  Meese  (eds.)
Geoblocking and digital video culture. Amsterdam: Institute of Network Cultures, p. 55.
5 Especially when the State obliges or enables directly traders to do so; in that case, the State
would restrict the freedom to deliver goods or to provide services, prohibited by Articles 34
and 56 of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Article  101 TFEU
would prohibit contracts between businesses containing geo-blocking clauses. In the same
way, Article 102 TFEU would prohibit dominant business from engaging in such an abusive
practice.
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2.1 THE 2015 ONLINE CONTENT PORTABILITY PROPOSAL
In an attempt  to avoid  situations  where  consumers  are  confronted  with
inaccessible  audio-visual  content  when  travelling  abroad  within
the European Union, the European Commission proposed an online content
portability Regulation in December 2015.6
To that extent the proposed Regulation would require that online service
providers  enable  their  subscribers  to use  the service  in the Member  State
of their temporary presence by providing them access to the same content
on the same  range  and number  of devices,  for the same  number  of users
and with the same range of functionalities as those offered in their Member
State  of residence.  This  obligation is  mandatory  and therefore  the parties
may  not  exclude  it,  derogate  from  it  or  vary  its  effect.  Any  action
by a service  provider which would prevent  the subscriber  from accessing
or using  the service  while  temporarily  present  in a Member  State,
for example restrictions to the functionalities of the service, would amount
to an illegal  circumvention  of the portability  rights  guaranteed
by the proposed Regulation.7
In very  general  terms,  the proposed  Regulation  obliges  a provider
of an online  content  service  to enable  a subscriber  who  is  temporarily
present  in a Member  State  to access  and use  the online  content  service
in the same  way  as made  possible  in the home  Member  State.8 More
specifically, providers have to offer subscribers access to the same content
on the same  range  and number  of devices,  for the same  number  of users
and with the same range of functionalities as those offered in their Member
State  of residence.9 The only  exception  to this  obligation  relates
to the quality  of the service  offered.  The services  provider  is  not  obliged
to deliver the same quality of online deliveries as was the case in the home
Member  State,  at least  on condition that  the subscriber  is  informed about
6 European  Commission  (2015)  Proposal  for a Regulation  of the European  Parliament
and of the Council on ensuring the cross-border portability of online content services in the internal
market. COM/2015/627 final. Available from: https://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/rep/
1/2015/EN/1-2015-627-EN-F1-1.PDF [Accessed 11 June 2017] (hereafter portability proposal).
See  also  Peifer,  K.-N.  (2016)  the Proposal  of the EU  Commission  for a Regulation
on Ensuring the Cross-Border Portability of Online Content Services in the Internal Market.
In: A. De Franceschi (ed.) European Contract Law and the Digital Single Market. the Implications
of the Digital Revolution. Antwerp: Intersentia, p. 164.
7 Recital 18 portability proposal.
8 Article 3(1) portability proposal.
9 Recital 18 portability proposal.
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this  quality  difference.10 In order  to overcome  copyright  difficulties
disputes,  the proposed  Regulation  would  establish  that  the provision,
the access to and the use of such online content service should be deemed
to occur in The Member State of the subscriber's residence.11
An online content service is defined more specifically as a service legally
provided  in a Member  State  qualifying  as an audio-visual  media  service,
i.e. a service  which is  under the editorial  responsibility of a media service
provider  and the principal  purpose  of which  is  the provision
of programmes,  in order  to inform,  entertain  or  educate,  to the general
public  by electronic  communications  networks  or  an audio-visual
commercial  communication.12 According  the European  Commission,
the proposal envisages above all
“video-on-demand  platforms  (Netflix,  HBO  Go,  Amazon  Prime,  Mubi,
Chili  TV),  online  TV services  (Viasat's  Viaplay,  Sky's  Now TV,  Voyo),
music streaming services (Spotify, Deezer,  Google Music) or game online
marketplaces (Steam, Origin).”13
Temporarily residing in that regard implies the presence of a subscriber
in a Member State other than the Member State of residence, without that
subscriber relinquishing his residence in the home Member State.14
The proposed Regulation would also cover any other service the main
feature  of which  is  the provision  of access  to and  use  of works,  other
protected  subject  matter  or  transmissions  of broadcasting  organisations,
whether  in a linear  or  an on-demand  manner,  which  is  provided
to a subscriber on agreed terms either against payment or money or without
payment  or money  yet  after  verification  of the subscriber’s  residence.15
An example  of the latter  could  be  a free  YouTube-user  profile  upon
completion  of a registration  form  requiring  the user  to provide  details
about his  location.  Online  content  services  which  are  provided  without
the payment of money and whose providers do not verify the Member State
10
Article 3(2) portability proposal.
11 Article 4 portability proposal.
12 Article 2(e) portability proposal.
13 European Commission (2017) Digital Single Market: EU negotiators agree on new rules allowing
Europeans to travel and enjoy online content services across borders. [press release] 7 February.
Available  from:  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-225_en.htm [Accessed  11  June
2017].
14 Article 2(d) portability proposal.
15 Article 2(e) portability proposal.
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of residence  of their  subscribers  remains  outside  the scope  of this
Regulation.
The Regulation  would  not  impose  specific  enforcement  obligations
on Member  States’  authorities  in this  regard.  It  nevertheless  firmly states
that  any  contractual  provisions  including  those  between  holders
of copyright  and related  rights,  those  holding  any  other  rights  relevant
for the use  of content  in online  content  services  and service  providers,
as well  as between  service  providers  and subscribers  which  do  not
guarantee such portability shall be deemed unenforceable.16 The Regulation
proposal adds to this that holders of copyright and related rights or those
holding any other rights in the content of online content services may ask
for verifications that the online content is used only by subscribers residing
temporarily in another Member State.17
On 26 May 2016,  the Council  agreed  on the principled  approach  taken
in the Commission’s  proposal.18 The European  Parliament  having  taken
a similar  position  on 29  November  2016,19 the European  Commission
managed  to reach  an agreement  on 7  February  2017  with  the Council
and The European  Parliament  to move  forward  the proposal  on online
content portability, transforming it in a directly applicable EU Regulation.20
If  and when  adopted,  the Regulation  would  be  applicable  to contracts
concluded and rights acquired before the date of its application if they are
relevant  for the provision,  the access  to and  the use  of an online  content
service after that date.21
2.2 THE 2016 GENERAL GEO-BLOCKING PROPOSAL
In an attempt  to remove  existing  barriers  to cross-border  online  trading
activities22,  the 2016  proposal  envisages  to capture  all  traders  engaging
16 Article 5(1) portability proposal.
17 Article 5(2) portability proposal.
18 See  Council  of the European  Union  (2016)  Portability  of digital  content:  Council  agreement
on main principles. [press release 26 May]. Available from: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/press/press-releases/2016/05/26-portability-digital-content/ [Accessed 11 June 2017].
19 European Parliament  (2016)  Watch your online films anywhere  in the EU: MEPs back  cross-
border portability. [press release] 29 November. Available from: http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/news/en/news-room/20161128IPR53511 [Accessed 11 June 2017].
20 European Commission (2017) Digital Single Market: EU negotiators agree on new rules allowing
Europeans to travel and enjoy online content services across borders. [press release] 7 February.
Available  from:  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-225_en.htm [Accessed  11  June
2017].
21 Article 7 portability proposal.
22 DSM Strategy, p. 5.
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in cross-border  geo-blocking  practices.  More  particularly,  it  is  meant
to provide more opportunities for customers not being able to buy products
and services from traders located in a different Member State or those being
discriminated  in accessing  the best  prices  or sales  conditions  compared
to nationals  or residents  of that  Member  State.23 Remarkably,  however,
the proposal  would  exclude  access  to audio-visual  content  available
in another Member State from its scope.24 As a result, traders could still geo-
block  customers  seeking  to access  an online  content  service  in another
Member State, based on their location or on their IP-address.
For geo-blocking  practices  falling  within  its  scope,  the proposed
Regulation  would  not  of itself  oblige  traders  to engage  in cross-border
commerce. The proposal only seeks to enable or facilitate envisaged cross-
border  commercial  transactions  taking  place  by means  of an online
interface, i.e. any software, including a website and applications, operated
by or  on behalf  of a trader,  which  serves  to give  customers  access
to the traders’  goods or  services  with a view to engaging  in a commercial
transaction  with  respect  to those  goods  and services.25 Consumers
or businesses  established  outside  the European  Union  but  being  geo-
blocked  by an EU  business  would  not  be  able  to benefit  from  the scope
of this  Regulation.26 As such,  the prohibitions  outlined  in it  only  apply
to situations  in which  a trader  established  in a Member  State  or  a third
country  offering  goods  or  services  in a Member  State  to customers
temporarily  residing  in that  same  state,  customers  established  in another
Member  State,  or  residing  in the same  Member  State  yet  having
the nationality of another Member State.27
23 Mazziotti, G. (2015), Is geo-blocking a real cause for concern in Europe?  EUI Law Working
Papers, (2015)43, pp. 8-11. Available from: http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/3808 [Accessed
11 June 2017].
24 See Article 2(g)  Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
December  2006  on services  in the internal  market.  Official  Journal  of the European  Union
(2006/L376/36) 27 December. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/En/TXT/
?uri=celex%3A32006L0123 [Accessed 11 June 2017].
25 Article 2(f), European Commission (2016)Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council on addressing geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based on customers'
nationality,  place  of residence  or  place  of establishment  within the internal  market  and amending
Regulation (EC) no 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC. COM (2016) 289 final. Available from:
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/proposal-regulation-geo-blocking
[Accessed 11 June 2017] (hereafter geo-blocking proposal).
26 For an interesting comparison regarding geo-location as a jurisdictional starting point in EU
cyberspace regulation, Svantesson, D.J.B. (2016) Nostradamus Lite – Selected speculations
as to the future of internet jurisdiction, Masaryk Journal of Law and Technology, 10(1), p. 59.
27 Article 1(2) geo-blocking proposal.
46 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology [Vol. 11:1
When  using  an online  interface,  traders  shall  not,  through  the use
of technological  measures  or  otherwise,  block  or  limit  customers’  access
to that  interface  for reasons  related  to the nationality,  place  of residence
or place  of establishment  of the customer.  Nor  should  they  redirect
customers  to a version  of their  interface  that  is  different,  by virtue  of its
layout,  use  of language  other  characteristics  that  make  it  specific
to customers  with  a particular  nationality,  place  of residence
or establishment,  from  the one  which  the customer  originally  wanted
to access.28 Such redirection can only take place with the customer’s explicit
consent;  in that  case,  the original  version  of the interface  has  to remain
easily  accessible  for that  customer  as well.29 The obligation  to refrain
from geo-blocking would apply even when traders do not explicitly direct
their  activities  to the territory  where  the customer  concerned  is  located.
However, Article 1, paragraph 5 of the proposed Regulation confirms that 
“The mere fact that a trader acts in accordance with the provisions of this
Regulation should not be construed as implying that he directs his activities
to the consumer's Member State for the purpose of such application.”
This  confirmation  is  important,  as EU  choice  of law  instruments
generally determine that the law of the consumer’s state of residence will be
applicable  in cross-border  consumer  contracts.  As a result,  the law
of the seller  would be  applicable  in transactions  subject  to this  regulation
but  not  specifically  directed  towards  the Member  State  of the customer’s
residence.30
In the same  vein,  the trader  cannot  apply  different  conditions
of payment  where  payments  are  made  by means  of electronic  transfer
28 Article 3(1) and (2) geo-blocking proposal.
29 Article 3(2), second sentence geo-blocking proposal.
30 Article 1(5) geo-blocking proposal. See also a newly proposed recital 10(a) by the European
Parliament.  On the notion  of directing,  see  Article  6(1)(b)  of Regulation  593/2008
of the European  Parliament  and of the Council  of 17  June  2008  on the law  applicable
to contractual obligations (Rome I). Official Journal of the European Union(2008/L177/6) 4 July.
Available from http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32008R0593
[Accessed 11 June 2017]. See also Article 17(1)(c) of Regulation 1215/2012 of the European
Parliament  and of the Council  of 12  December  2012  on jurisdiction  and the recognition
and enforcement  of judgments  in civil  and commercial  matters.  Official  Journal
of the European Union (2012/L 351/1) 20 December. Available from: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=celex%3A32012R1215  [Accessed  11  June  2017].  According
to the Court of Justice, directing activities towards a Member State implies that the trader
was envisaging doing business with consumers domiciled in one or more Member States,
including the Member State of that consumer’s  domicile,  in the sense that it was minded
to conclude a contract with them, see CJEU, Joined Cases C-585/08 and C-144/09,  Pammer
and Alpenhof, para 92.
2017] P. Van Cleynenbreugel: The European Commission's Geo-blocking ... 47
within  the same  payment  brand.31 The obligation  to give  access
to the original  interface  is  not  absolute,  however.  Indeed,  the proposed
Regulation  highlights  that  the trader  is  not  obliged  to grant  access  to its
interface  whenever  this  is  necessary  to ensure  compliance  with  a legal
requirement in EU law or in the laws of the Member  States,  in accordance
with Union law.32 In that case, the trader has to provide a clear justification
for doing  so  in the language  of the online  interface  that  the customer
originally sought to access.33
In addition  to the generally  applicable  obligation  to grant  access
to the online interface, the proposal also prohibits traders to apply different
general  conditions of access  to their  goods or services,  for reasons related
to the nationality  or  place  of residence  or  establishment  of the customer
where the trader sells goods and those goods are not delivered cross-border
directly to the Member State of the customer by the trader or on his behalf,
where  the trader  provides  electronically  supplied  services  or  where
the services  provided  are  supplied  to the customer  in the premises
of the trader  situated  in a Member  State  other  than  that  of the customer’s
nationality  or place  of residence.34 In those  circumstances,  traders  cannot
justify a refusal to trade with a customer on the same terms and conditions
as the ones  applicable  to those  having  the nationality  of or residing
in the same Member State.35
The Regulation  also  confirms  that  agreements  imposing  on traders
obligations to act in violation of it in terms of passive sales (i.e. transactions
initiated  by the customer,  the trader  not  actively  recruiting  its  customers
in another Member State) are considered to be automatically void.36
On 28 November 2016,  the Council  adopted  a Common  position
regarding  the Commission’s  proposal.  According  to the Council,
the Regulation  should  prohibit  only  unjustified  geo-blocking.37 In its
common  position,  the Council  proposed  more  or less  marginal
31 Article 5 geo-blocking proposal.
32 Article 3(3) geo-blocking proposal.
33 Article 3(4) geo-blocking proposal.
34 Article  4(1)  geo-blocking  proposal.  The Regulation  in this  regard  envisages  hotel
accommodation,  sport  events,  car  rental,  and entry  tickets  to music  festivals  or leisure
parks, see recital 20.
35 Article 4(3) geo-blocking proposal  nevertheless permits Member States to maintain fixed
book  prices  as long  as they  are  in compliance  with  EU  law,  as well  as to  maintain
restrictions explicitly permitted as a matter  of EU law. Beyond those restrictions,  traders
cannot justify themselves.
36 Article 6 geo-blocking proposal.
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modifications,  without  directly  changing  the ambit  of the Commission’s
proposal.  The European  Parliament  Internal  Market  and Consumer
Protection  Committee  on 25  April  2017  adopted  a common  position,
following which negotiations on a final text between the three institutions
can  take  place.38 The Parliament’s  Committee  position  above  all  seeks
to stress  the need  to protect  consumers,  replaces  the word  ‘nationality’
by ‘country of origin’ and aims to make even clearer that traders respecting
this  obligation  are  not  necessarily  directing  their  activities  to any  part
of the EU  internal  market  for the purposes  of determining  the applicable
Member State’s consumer protection law.39
3. HEADING  IN  THE  WRONG  DIRECTION,  PIECE
BY PIECE? 
Both sets of geo-blocking proposals reflect a prohibition-focused approach:
to the extent that certain commercial practices limit or render more difficult
cross-border trade in goods or services, EU law will take steps to prohibit it.
Given  that  mere  prohibitions  do  not  as such  result  in more  e-commerce,
flanking  policies  are  meant  to encourage  consumers  to actually  engage
in more  such  transactions.  That  approach,  also  already  reflected
in the e-commerce  Directive  2000/3140,  seemingly  remains  the preferable
way  forward  in the realm  of e-commerce  regulation,  contributing
to enhanced European private law standards.41
37 Council  of the European  Union  (2016)  Proposal  for a Regulation  of the European  Parliament
and of the Council  on addressing unjustified geo-blocking  and other forms of discrimination based
on customers'  nationality,  place  of residence  or place  of establishment  within the internal  market
and amending  Regulation  (EC)  no 2006/2004  and Directive  2009/22/EC  –  general  approach.
2016/0152 (COD). Available from: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-14663-
2016-INIT/en/pdf [Accessed  11  June  2017].  This  document  contains  the modifications
proposed by the Council.
38 See  European  Parliament  (2016)  Geo-blocking  and other  forms  of discrimination  based
on customers'  nationality,  place  of residence  or place  of establishment  within the internal  market.
2016/0152(COD).  Available  from:  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/popups/fiche
procedure.do?lang=&reference=2016/0152(COD) [Accessed11 June 2017].
39 See  to that  extent,  modifications  proposed  to Articles  1(1),  1(5)  and 2(2)(c)
of the Commission’s proposal.
40 Directive  2000/31/EC  of the European  Parliament  and of the Council  of 8  June  2000
on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce,
in the Internal Market.  Official Journal of the European Union  (2000/L178/1). Available from:
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0031:en:HTML
[Accessed  11  June  2017]. Waelde,  C.  (2005),  Article  3,  ECD:  Internal  Market  Clause.
International  Private  Law,  Consumers  and the Net:  a Confusing Maze or  a Smooth Path
Towards  a Single  European  Market?  In:  L.  Edwards  (ed.)  the New  Legal  Framework
for E-Commerce in Europe. Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 3-30.
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Although  the need  for more  specific  EU  regulation  of e-commerce
deserves  to be  questioned  as such42,  this  paper  would  like  to argue  that,
even when one assumes that some kind of regulatory intervention is needed
indeed in this field, the approach chosen by the European Commission can
be criticised from two angles. Those angles relate to the enforcement limits
(3.1)  and seemingly  increased  circumvention  risks  (3.2)  exacerbated
by the proposed  e-commerce  regulations  in general  and the geo-blocking
proposals in particular.
3.1 ENFORCEMENT LIMITS
The mere  adoption  of portability  rights  or  online  trade  restrictions’
prohibitions does not in itself guarantee the removal of obstacles to a DSM
and the concomitant  increase  in cross-border  trade.  Effective  e-commerce
regulation  also  requires  targeted  supervision  and enforcement  actions,
guaranteeing  that  the EU  law  provisions  adopted  are  implemented
in a coherent  fashion  across  the different  Member  States.  In that  respect,
both  geo-blocking  proposals,  although  showing  concern  for such
enforcement, are too limited in scope and scale for them to be able to fulfil
the ambitions  of a streamlined  common  DSM  agenda  set  at the European
Union level.
The 2015 portability proposal only explains that contractual limitations
to subscription portability  are  prohibited,  leaving it  to the Member  States
to enforce  that  provision.  The 2016  geo-blocking  proposal  requires  more
oversight  in terms  of compliance.  Designated  Member  State  enforcement
bodies will have to ensure compliance with the Regulation.43 In that respect,
the European  Commission  obliges  Member  States’  competent  consumer
protection authorities to have minimum enforcement powers to tackle intra-
Union  consumer  law  violations.  Those  powers  should  include
the possibility  to request  information  regarding  traders  from  online
platforms,  to close down a website,  domain or similar digital  site,  service
41 Micklitz, H. W. (2016) The economic efficiency rationale and European private law. In: G.
Comparato, H. W. Micklitz and Y. Svetiev (eds.) European regulatory private law – Autonomy,
competition and regulation in European private law. Florence: EUI Law Working Papers 2016(6),
p. 59. Available from: http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/40376 [Accessed 11 June 2017].
42 Brotman,  S.N.  (2016)  the European  Union’s  Digital  Single  Market  Strategy:  A conflict
between  government’s  desire  for certainty  and rapid  marketplace  innovation?  Centre
for Technology Innovation at Brookings Working Papers, pp. 1-7. Available from: https://www.
brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/digital-single-market.pdf [Last accessed 11 June
2017].
43 Article 7(1) geo-blocking proposal.
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or account  or  a part  of it,  including  by requesting  a third  party  or  other
public  authority  to implement  such measures  or the possibility to impose
penalties  on traders.44 The authorities  should  be  able  either  directly
to impose those sanctions or apply to competent Member State courts to do
so.45 The European Parliament proposes to add that the sanctions are to be
communicated  to the Commission,  which  is  to make  them  publically
available  on its  website.46 as a result,  the existing  consumer  protection
authorities  in Member  States  would  receive  specific  powers  aimed
at preventing  and penalising  geo-blocking  practices  prohibited
by the envisaged Regulation. 
Despite  those modest  enforcement  initiatives,  the scope  for uniform
or coordinated  enforcement  of EU  geo-blocking  regulation,  and more
generally DSM regulation, is likely to remain limited in two ways.
Firstly, the particular nature of the EU legal order implies that Member
States remain responsible for the enforcement of EU legal provisions, even
when  covered  by a directly  applicable  Regulation.  The fact  that  different
authorities will have to interpret and apply the same provisions, gives rise
to diverging interpretations and enforcement strategies. As those authorities
are  independent  from  direct  oversight  by EU  institutions,  they  may
determine,  to the extent  permitted  by Member  States’  law,  their  own
enforcement  priorities.47 As a result,  the enforcement  of DSM  provisions
may  not  be  ranked  as high  as their  adoption  has  been  among  EU
policymakers.  On top  of that,  the differentiated  structure  of different
Member  States’  authorities may have an impact  on the resources  devoted
in different  Member  States  to implement  and enforce  the EU  DSM
provisions.  As a result,  the application  and enforcement  of EU  law
provisions  cannot  be  guaranteed  in a consistent  way.  In order  to tackle
those  defects,  the establishment  of a consumer  protection  coordination
network offers a step towards some convergence in enforcement practices.
However,  this  network does  not  in itself  guarantee  that  more  coherence
44 Article 8(2), European Commission (2016)Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament
and of the Council  on cooperation  between  national  authorities  responsible  for the enforcement
of consumer  protection  laws.  COM/2016/283  final.  Available  from:  http://ec.europa.eu/
consumers/consumer_rights/unfair-trade/docs/cpc-revision-proposal_en.pdf [Accessed  11
June 2017] (hereafter consumer enforcement proposal).
45 Article 9(1) consumer enforcement proposal.
46 Article  7,  paragraph  2a,  geo-blocking  proposal,  amendment  proposed  by the European
Parliament.
47 Wils, W. (2011) Discretion and Prioritisation in Public Antitrust Enforcement, in Particular
EU Antitrust Enforcement, World Competition, 34(3), pp. 357-360.
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in enforcement  priorities can be attained,  all  the more since the European
Commission is not directly injecting enforcement priorities in this network,
in contrast with a similar network in EU competition law enforcement.48
Secondly, enforcement at Member State level does not necessarily take
place  by one  single  enforcement  body  or  authority.  As a result,  different
actors  may  be  involved  at the enforcement  level,  even  within  one
and the same  Member  State.  The EU  regulatory  framework  does  not
impede this phenomenon, but rather confirms it. In the context of the 2016
geo-blocking  proposal,  it  has  to be  reminded  that  consumer  protection
authorities taking sanctions against unjustified geo-blocking practices only
have  powers in relation to trader-consumer  relationships.  Member  States’
authorities  will  not  be  able  to target  those  practices.  Either  the courts
or specific authorities, set up in accordance with Member States’ own rules
and practices,  will  be  tasked  to enforce  the EU  law  provisions  in that
context.
It  can  therefore  be  concluded  that  both  the geo-blocking  proposals
in particular  and the DSM  agenda  more  generally  fail  to pay  sufficient
attention  to the need  for a coordinated  enforcement  system.  In order
to guarantee  that  the EU  law  provisions  covered  in the geo-blocking
Regulations would be enforced truly, attention to such enforcement venues
is more than necessary. In just subscribing to the existing weak coordinated
consumer  protection coordination framework,  the geo-blocking proposals
fail  to take  into  account  the need  for a truly  EU  enforcement  approach
in this  domain.  Given  that  other  sectors  are  characterised  by such
a coordinated  enforcement  approach,  its  absence  is  a consequence
of political unwillingness rather than a lack of competence to set up a more
coordinated enforcement mechanism.
3.2 INCREASED CIRCUMVENTION RISKS?
The geo-blocking proposals,  and the regulatory approach  they  reflect,  are
presented  as consistent  with  earlier  legislation  and therefore  justified
and desirable as a way forward.49 Nearly exclusive attention to consistency
with  other  legal  instruments  has  the perverse  effect  of increasing  risks
48 Betlem, G. (2007), Public and private transnational enforcement of EU consumer law. In: W.
van Boom  and M.  Loos  (eds.)  Collective  enforcement  of Consumer  Law.  Securing  compliance
in Europe  through  private  group  action and public  authority  intervention,  Groningen:  Europa
Law Publishing, pp. 37-62.
49 Portability proposal, pp. 2-3 and geo-blocking proposal, pp. 2-3.
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for rules’  circumvention.  DSM  regulation  appears  to be  especially  prone
to those risks.
In confirming  that  proposed  geo-blocking  regulations  are  consistent
with other  existing  regulatory  instruments,  the European  Commission
seems to be convinced sufficiently that the regulation will work in practice
as well.  Somewhat  paradoxically,  however,  despite  or maybe  because
of the quasi-exclusive attention to macro-level consistency with the general
objectives of the establishment of the EU internal market, the EU legislator
runs  the risk  of neglecting  fundamental  circumvention  risks  associated
with this type of regulation.
The geo-blocking proposals vividly illustrate those risks, as they tackle
only  a few  situations,  leaving  all  non-covered  types  of geo-blocking  like
practices  outside  the scope  of EU  law.  It  should  be  remembered  in this
respect, that EU internal market law prohibits in principle all state-imposed
restrictions, but leaves untouched private actions limiting access to a market
in another  Member  State.  Absent  regulatory  intervention,  those  private
actions remain unaffected by EU law. This is most clear in the geo-blocking
proposals.  Firstly,  the data  portability  proposal  would  only  permit
subscribers  to take  their  content  with  them.  Any non-subscribed  content
could  still  be  blocked  since  it  would  not  be  covered  by the Regulation.
Secondly,  the proposed  Regulation  would  target  online  sales  of goods
and services  except  for those  exempted  from  the scope  of application
of the services  Directive.  In doing  so,  the proposal  envisages  a specific
situation  where  obstacles  created  by private  traders  are  prohibited
as a matter  of EU  secondary  legislation,  yet  also  threatens  to introduce
a distinction  between  situations  where  customers  can  rely  on those
provisions  and all  situations  (such  as access  to audio-visual  media
in the absence of a subscription) not covered by the Regulation. In the same
way,  the simple  refusal  to use  certain  payment  brands  may  result
in the exclusion  of certain  traders’  practices  from  the scope  of the same
Regulation.  In not  wishing  to cover  the entire  spectrum  of e-commerce
transactions that could be subjected to geo-blocking, the EU does facilitate
circumvention,  inviting  traders  to reflect  about  practices  not  technically
falling within the scope of the envisaged Regulations, yet having the same
effects in practice. The chosen regulatory approach in tackling geo-blocking
is therefore, by its very nature, selective and prone to keep certain obstacles
to e-commerce in place.
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It  can therefore be concluded that justifying the proposed Regulations
as being consistent with other legal rules detracts attention from the actual
circumvention  risks  they  harbour  and that  remain  unaddressed  in this
respect.  To the extent  that  EU  legislation  intervenes  to prohibit  certain
actions or to remove certain obstacles  maintained by private  actors,  albeit
in a consistent  way,  only  those  actions  covered  by legislation  will  be
prohibited.  Other  types of private  actions will  remain legal,  even though
their  effects  may  be  very  similar  to the ones  prohibited.  In that
understanding,  it would pay off more than ever for traders to make sure
they  fall  outside  the narrow  scope  of the envisaged  Regulations  in order
to continue  their  geo-blocking  practices.  Not  offering  payments  through
certain brands already suffices in that respect and would be perfectly legal.
4.  TOWARDS  MORE  SUSTAINABLE  EU  E-COMMERCE
REGULATION?
The enforcement  limits  and rules’  circumvention  risks  outlined
in the previous  section  showcase  the principal  defects  associate
with the EU’s regulatory approach implementing the DSM agenda. Despite
those  shortcomings,  however,  the geo-blocking  proposals  also  reflect
the nucleus of two legal-political  strategies  which,  whilst  not  overcoming
them, could at least mitigate the detrimental effects of a lack of coordinated
enforcement  and a narrow  focus.  Taking  those  strategies  more  seriously,
it will be submitted, will allow those effects to be less prominently present
in the application and implementation of those legal instruments.
This section identifies where elements of those legal-political strategies
can  be  detected  in the geo-blocking  proposals’  context  and how  more
explicit  attention  to them  can  alleviate  limited  enforcement  and narrow
focus concerns. In that regard, this section particularly argues that a more
streamlined  EU  competition  and e-commerce  regulation  enforcement
strategy (4.1), complemented by a more technologically more pro-active EU
law interpretation stance (4.2) could in themselves already partly address
the concerns  voiced  in the previous  section.  Given  the presence  –  albeit
somewhat  implicit  –  of both  strategies  in the geo-blocking  proposals,
it would  be  rather  easy  to give  a more  prominent  place  to them  when
continuing to design and implement the DSM regulatory framework.
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4.1  STREAMLINING  EU  COMPETITION  LAW  AND
E-COMMERCE REGULATION ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES
In addressing  geo-blocking  practices,  the Commission’s  proposals
demonstrate how EU internal market regulation and EU competition law
can  interact  and complement  each  other.  That  possibility
of complementarity  could be  elaborated  further  in order to address  some
of the enforcement concerns underlying the EU’s DSM regulatory approach.
The relationship  between  internal  market  regulation  and competition
law  has  been  considered  traditionally  as one  of complementarity
and separateness; Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in principle only target private
action, whereas  internal market law regulates  public  authorities’  action.50
At the same time, EU competition law only envisages an ex post intervention
in the assessment  of anticompetitive  practices  engaged  in by or between
private  actors.51 Agreements  have  to have  been  concluded  or  abusive
behaviour  has  to be  engaged  in prior  to the European  Commission
or national  competition  authorities  taking  action  in those  domains.
In addition,  those  authorities  only  intervene  Given  the ex  post
and case-by-case focus of EU competition law, it would not be surprising
that  the EU  legislature  would  like  to intervene  by prohibiting  certain
practices deemed anticompetitive in an ex ante fashion.  Ex ante regulatory
intervention  in those  circumstances  is  seen  as a way  to complement
the existing  Treaty  competition  law  prohibitions,  covering  situations  not
directly  covered  by them,  or  to directly  target  the behaviour  of non-
dominant  undertakings.  In addition,  the EU  institutions  could  further
clarify  the competition  law  provisions  by means  of EU  internal  market
secondary legislation in a particular economic sector, such as e-commerce.52
It  will  not  be  surprising  that  both  geo-blocking  proposals  reflect  this
complementarity relationship. Both proposals have been made in the light
of a competition  law  inquiry  into  the e-commerce  sector,  which  has
permitted to detect  the prevalence  of geo-blocking practices,  both relating
50 Mataija,  M.  (2016)  Private  Regulation  and the Internal  Market.  Sports,  Legal  Services,
and Standard Setting in EU Economic Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press,  p. 119.
51 Council  Regulation  1/2003  of 16  December  2002  on the implementation  of the rules
on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty.  Official Journal of the European
Union (2003/L  1/1).  Available  from:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/ALL/?uri=
CELEX%3A32003R0001 [Accessed 11 June 2017].
52 Ackermann,  T.  (2010),  Vodafone:  Price  Regulation as a Substitute  for Intervention under
Article 102 TFEU. Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 1(5), p. 428.
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to audio-visual  contents  and to the sales  of goods  and services.53 Directly
addressing  those  concerns,  the 2015  data  portability  proposal  envisages
the non-enforceability  of contractual  clauses  between  copyright  holders
and online service  providers  restricting data  portability.  In doing so,  this
Regulation  would  confirm  that  any  such  contractual  clause  is  to be
considered  contrary  to Article  101  TFEU.  In the same  way,  unilateral
business practices escaping from competition law scrutiny are prohibited
by the 2016  geo-blocking  proposal.  In addition,  Article  6  of that  proposal
declares void all geo-blocking agreements restricting passive sales. Whilst
the Commission  proposed  an absolute  prohibition  of such  clauses,
the Council and Parliament propose to amend this provision by stating that
only  those  clauses  that  could  not  be  justified  by Article  101(3)  TFEU
or by Regulation 330/2010 exempting vertical  agreements  from the Article
101(1) TFEU prohibition would be considered void.54 In being formulated
in this  way,  both  proposals  clearly  clarify  or  complement  the application
of competition law provisions in specific contexts.
The implicit  acknowledgement  of the complementarity  of competition
law and internal market regulation in both proposals constitutes a starting
point  for a more  developed  and focused  enforcement  strategy  capable
of mitigating  enforcement  limits  identified  in this  respect.  As EU
competition law’s attention clearly also goes to e-commerce practices, it can
be  expected  that  both  the European Commission  and the Member  States’
competition authorities will consider contractual and abusive geo-blocking
practices  as an enforcement  priority.  To the extent  that  this  is  the case,
e-commerce cases will likely be brought before those authorities in the years
to come.  In this setting,  it  would not be  entirely unimaginable to entrust,
at Member  States’  level,  national  competition  authorities  also
with the enforcement  of geo-blocking  practices  which  escape  strictly
from the scope  of application  of EU  competition  law.  In some  Member
States  such  as the Netherlands,  the United  Kingdom  or  Poland,55
competition  and consumer  protection law  are  already  being  enforced
by one and the same authority.  In the alternative,  it would seem relatively
53 Geo-blocking initial findings report, note 4.
54 Newly proposed Article 6(2) geo-blocking proposal. Commission Regulation 330/2010 of 20
April  2010  on the application  of Article  101(3)  of the Treaty  on the Functioning
of the European Union to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices. Official
Journal  of the European Union (2010/L102/1).  Available from:  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX%3A32010R0330 [Accessed 11 June 2017].
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easy  to propose,  through  the intermediary  of the European  Competition
Network  (ECN)  chaired  by the European Commission56,  the prioritisation
and coordination,  at Member  States’  level,  of geo-blocking  cases  not
technically falling within the scope of EU competition law. From that point
of view,  the European  Commission  could  indirectly  yet  effectively  offer
guidelines  to those  national  authorities  on how  to prioritise  and set  up
coordination  memoranda with  other  authorities  tasked
with the enforcement  of EU  competition  law.  Whilst  not  resolving  all
enforcement  limits  accompanying  the EU’s  DSM  regulatory  approach,
streamlining  by intermediary  of the ECN  would  permit  to at least  bring
to the forefront  the need  for coordinated  enforcement  and to streamline
the Regulation’s  application  above  and beyond  the specific  context
of anticompetitive behaviour at the level of the Member States.
The suggestions  outlined  here  would  require  no direct  legislative
intervention.  Quite  on the contrary,  relying  on the existing  coordinated
enforcement  structure  accompanying  EU  competition  law  enforcement,
the European Union could nudge Member  States’  competition authorities
in either taking the lead in or coordinating with other enforcement agencies.
Whilst  imperfect,  implementing  such  cooperation  mechanisms  would
at the very least ensure that some of the limited enforcement concerns can
be  overcome  by putting  in place  enhanced  Member  State  cooperation
mechanisms.  Given  the potential  anticompetitive  effects  of copyright,
it could even be envisaged that this streamlining strategy could also take
place  in relation  to the enforcement  of other  future  DSM  regulation
instruments.
4.2  TOWARDS “TECHNOLOGICALLY MORE  PRO-ACTIVE” EU
LAW INTERPRETATIONS?
One of the major issues with regulating digital transactions and commercial
practices is  that  technological  developments  generally  precede legislative
responses.  Legal  rules  are  generally  adopted in response  to technological
55 The Dutch Consumer and Markets authority (ACM), https://www.acm.nl [Accessed 11 June
2017],  the U.K.  Competition  and Markets  Authority  (CMA),  https://www.gov.uk/
government/organisations/competition-and-markets-authority [Accessed  11  June  2017]
and the Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection (UOKIK), https://uokik.gov.
pl/home.php [Accessed 11 June 2017].
56 On  that  network,  see  Gerard  D.  (2011)  the ECN  –  Network  antitrust  enforcement
in the European  Union. In:  I.  Lianos  and D.  Gerard  (eds.)  Research  Handbook  on EU
competition law., Cheltenham: Edward Elgarpp. 181-226.
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challenges and the DSM regulatory approach is not different in this regard.
Both geo-blocking Regulation proposals directly respond to concerns voiced
in market  and competition  law  studies,  permitting  to conclude  that  geo-
blocking was still  very prevalent across the European Union. At the same
time,  however,  the geo-blocking  proposals  not  only  respond  to certain
technological challenges recognised, but also seek to establish a regulatory
framework that would be fit for future e-commerce transactions. With this
in mind, both proposals define online content  service or online interfaces
in a very  general  and broad  fashion,  permitting  not  only  traditional
websites  or subscription services to be taken into account,  but also cloud
services and other online or digital venues in relation to which commercial
transactions  can  take  place.57 On top of that,  the 2016  proposal  envisages
a review four years after its entry into force and every five years thereafter.58
The first review will especially have as its goal to evaluate whether access
to audio-visual services at large should be granted in this respect.59 As such,
it is clear that the Commission shows to care about pro-actively regulating
a technological  field  that  is  in development  and that  may  result  in new
instances  of geo-blocking  currently  not  encountered  or envisaged
in practice.
Paying  attention  to future  developments  when  developing  market
regulation  permits  to avoid  or  at least  address  as quickly  as possible
the circumvention  of legal  rules  and to guarantee  the responsiveness
of regulation  to challenges  posited  in a given  context.60 The Commission’s
willingness to engage in a review of the geo-blocking legislation envisaged
is therefore laudable and would permit to code in certain. At the same time,
however,  the mere  review  and re-opening  of policy  discussions
on the aptitude of the envisaged Regulation does not permit truly to set up
a framework  that  responds  directly  to new  challenges  posed
by technological  innovations.  Such  a framework  would  require  traders
to “code  in”  from  the outset  an attitude  that  prevents  geo-blocking
from being introduced in interfaces  that  are  presently  unknown but  may
57 Article 2(e) portability proposal and Article 2(f) geo-blocking proposal.
58 Article 9(1) geo-blocking proposal, and the modification from two to four years proposed
by the Council.
59 Article 9(2) geo-blocking proposal.
60 See Ayres, I. and Braithwaite J. (1995) Responsive Regulation – Transcending the Deregulation
Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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soon  conquer  the market.61 By defining  broadly  the notion  of interface,
the Commission can in some way already attain this goal.
However,  that  in itself  is  not  sufficient.  If  the Commission,
and by extension, the other EU institutions are taking seriously the adoption
of digital  markets  regulation  that  envisages  to apply  the same  principles
of non-discrimination to online  interfaces  in interfaces  that  have  not been
proposed  or constructed,  more  tailored  immediate  action  would  be
advisable to the extent that the adoption of updated regulations would take
too much time. In that respect, it is submitted that it will pay off to ensure
that  interpretative  guidelines are  in place informing those new interfaces
of their  obligations  the moment  those  new  interfaces  begin to  be  active
on the European market.  Even though such  guidelines  are  not binding  –
and a contrary  interpretation  of the legislation  underlying  them  can  be
given indeed by the Court of Justice62 – they would at least give some prima
facie expectations as to the applicability of the geo-blocking or more general
DSM  regulatory  frameworks  to those  new  interfaces.  Such  a pro-active
interpretative guidelines action could in that regard contribute to avoiding
rules’  circumvention  in this  particular  context.  The adoption  of such
guidelines would not require immediate legislative intervention, but only
requires the Commission to be vigilant as to the potential application of its
existing regulatory framework to new technological developments. In doing
so,  the Commission  could  take  into  consideration  an approach  already
voiced by the Court of Justice in its  Ker-Optika  judgment,  following which
any  restriction  on cross-border  ecommerce  is  almost  automatically  to be
considered a restriction on the free movement of goods rather than a selling
arrangement  not  covered  by the Article  34  TFEU  prohibition.63 Taking
a similar stance and adopting concrete ways forward inspired by such case
law could help already in developing this more pro-active stance.
5. CONCLUSION
This paper  analysed both  geo-blocking proposals and the typical  features
of the EU’s regulatory approach they reflect. Paying attention to the scope
61 For  that perspective,  Lessig,  L.  (1999)  Code and other laws of Cyberspace.  New York: Basic
Books, pp. 6-7.
62 e.g. CJEU, Case C-360/09, Pfleiderer. para 21.
63 CJEU, C-108/09, Ker-Optika, para 69.
2017] P. Van Cleynenbreugel: The European Commission's Geo-blocking ... 59
and limits of both proposals, the paper identified the ways in which the EU
seeks to prohibit different geo-blocking practices. Despite being a laudable
effort  to stimulate  e-commerce,  it  was  submitted  that  the geo-blocking
proposals  are  characterised  by a limited  enforcement  and narrow
consistency  focus,  which  would  potentially  facilitate  their  circumvention
in practice.  At the same  time,  however,  they  harbour  features  for a more
coordinated  enforcement  strategy  as well  as a technologically  pro-active
regulatory focus. Although imperfect, acknowledging more explicitly those
features  in practice  would  serve  to alleviate  concerns  voiced
over the limited practical  impact  of the geo-blocking  proposals  and,  more
generally, the EU’s DSM regulatory framework. This paper outlined ways
to make those features more explicit, without necessarily having to amend
the legislative  framework  in force,  in an attempt  to downplay
the enforcement  limits  and circumvention  risks  otherwise  associated
with the EU’s regulatory approach.
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